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Abstract—In the face of an increasingly broad cyberattack
surface, cyberattack-resilient load forecasting for electric utilities
is both more necessary and more challenging than ever. In
this paper, we propose an adversarial machine learning (AML)
approach, which can respond to a wide range of attack behaviors
without detecting outliers. It strikes a balance between enhancing
a system’s robustness against cyberattacks and maintaining a
reasonable degree of forecasting accuracy when there is no
attack. Attack models and configurations for the adversarial
training were selected and evaluated to achieve the desired level
of performance in a simulation study. The results validate the
effectiveness and excellent performance of the proposed method.
Index Terms—Adversarial training, artificial neural network,
load forecasting, attack model, cyber security
I. INTRODUCTION
FORECASTING the electricity load is of paramount im-portance in the operation, planning and marketing of
power systems. It is greatly needed at both transmission and
distribution levels for various tasks such as hydro scheduling,
hydro-thermal coordination, unit commitment, economic dis-
patch, automatic generation control, load flow analysis, power
purchase, and load switching [1], [2]. Traditionally, utilities
were mainly concerned with the timeliness and accuracy of the
predictions. Issues were mainly focused from the economic
perspective. For instance, a better load forecasting enables
utilities to properly assign online and offline reserves since
the cost of reserves is very high [3]. Very little attention was
paid to cyber security issues.
However, with the increasing deployment of smart grid
technologies like sensing, digital control, and communication
infrastructure, the data needed as input for forecasting models
can be compromised by a cyber adversary through various
means. For instance, real-time forecasting data significantly
rely on power grids’ communication, control, and computing
infrastructures, as well as their hardware facilities, all of which
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are vulnerable to attacks [4], [5]. The aggregation of data
usually requires diverse data sources, which also gives rise to a
wide attack surface [6], [7]. Moreover, the cryptographic algo-
rithms used to preserve the aggregated data can be decrypted
if the attackers have strong capabilities or have enough time to
improve their abilities [8]. Further, the long duration of data
preservation requires the migration of data, and the migration
process also poses security challenges [9].
A common approach to cyberattack-resilient load forecast-
ing is to remove malicious data through the use of anomaly
detection techniques [10]. Some methods are based on descrip-
tive analytics, which identify point, contextual, and collective
anomalies such as abnormal patterns [11], [12]. Other methods
are model-based and compare predicted values with observed
ones [13], [14]. Although anomaly detection is an important
step in cleaning the input data, some anomalies may remain
undetected, and false alarms may also be raised, which still
need to be dealt with by the forecasting model [15]–[18].
It is necessary to reduce the sensitivity of the forecasting
model to malicious input data and, thus, mitigate the impact
of unidentified cyberattacks.
Many robust load forecasting methods have been devised
by down-weighting the observations that are more likely to
be anomalies. For instance, the weight functions of Huber’s
seminal work [19] are widely used. [20] used robust versions
of the exponential and Holt-Winters smoothing methods. Ro-
bust ensemble approaches such as robust functional principal
component analysis have also been applied to load forecasting
[21]–[23]. However, most of the existing robust methods are
only concerned with outliers, namely, the extremely high/low
observations. More sophisticated and better disguised attacks
may not be remedied by the existing robust methods.
Adversarial machine learning (AML) is a recent technique
that promises to enhance the robustness of machine learning
(ML) based forecasting methods against cyberattacks. The
traditional practice in training ML models is to use clean
data only, but this means that the output will be erroneous
if the input data become contaminated. AML trains the model
with both clean data and malicious data generated by the
defender [24]. The adversarially trained models are then robust
to the attacks used in the adversarial training [25], [26]. How-
ever, most existing works on AML are on image recognition,
where there is little ambiguity in the output regardless of the
adversarial input [27]. In the context of cyberattack-resilient
load forecasting, AML approaches to image recognition cannot
be directly applied. It was unclear how to set attack models
and their parameters during the adversarial training stage.
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2In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of using AML for
an artificial neural network (ANN)-based load forecasting. A
practical study is constructed using the publicly available data
from the Global Energy Forecasting Competition 2012 (GEF-
Com2012) [28], [29]. This is the first application of AML to
cyberattack-resilient load forecasting. The main contributions
of this paper are fourfold:
• The impacts of different cyberattacks on the traditional
ANN-based load forecasting are evaluated.
• An accelerated adversarial training is developed for
AML-based load forecasting. It maintains the robustness,
and at the same time is efficient and easy to employ.
• A strategic framework for AML-based load forecasting is
established. It strikes a balance between two objectives:
ensuring robust performance in forecasting error under
various attacks and under no attack.
• The selection of attack models and configurations for
the adversarial training is extensively investigated in a
simulation study. It provides valuable insights of how
to set attack models and their parameters during the
adversarial training stage.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The cyber
security issues with ANN-based load forecasting are reviewed
in Section II. Section III discusses how AML is adapted to
load forecasting and provides specifics on the strategies used to
select adversary models in the training stage. The results of our
numerical investigation are reported in Section IV. Section V
concludes the paper.
II. ANN LOAD FORECASTING UNDER CYBERATTACKS
This section describes the data, the ANN load forecasting
model, and the attack models. It also investigates the perfor-
mance of the ANN model under various types of attacks.
A. Data Description
The publicly available GEFCom2012 dataset has been
widely used as a testbed in the load forecasting community.
For instance, it has been used to evaluate the forecasting
accuracy of various short-term load forecasting methods [29]–
[31]. Specifically, this dataset consists of 4.5 years of hourly
loads and temperatures from 20 zones. In this paper, we took
three years (2004-2006) of load data from the first zone for
our empirical study. Two years’ data spanning 2004 and 2005
were used as the training data, and the 2006 data were used
as the testing data. For more details of the data used in this
study, readers are referred to [28].
B. ANN Load Forecasting Model
Machine learning approaches have increasingly attracted
attention in forecasting electricity load because of their flex-
ibility and ease of use [32]. A typical ANN consists of a
collection of neurons, each of which receives multiple inputs,
processes them internally, and outputs a response. Different
weights are allocated during the linear combination of the
inputs, and the result is further handled via a non-linear
activation function, e.g., a sigmoid function. A multi-layered
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Fig. 1. Comparison results of ANN-based load forecasting and actual values
on the testing data throughout 2006.
ANN consists of an input layer, one or more hidden layers,
and an output layer. The network propagates the values from
the input layer through the hidden layer(s) to the output layer,
where a squared error loss can be obtained
L(zˆm, zm) =
1
2
(zˆm − zm)2, (1)
where m denotes the mth pair of the input and output, zˆm
is the network output after using the activation function, zm
is the actual value, and L(zˆm, zm) is the squared error loss
between zˆm and zm. A loss function can thus be computed as
E =
1
Nr
Nr∑
m=1
L(zˆm, zm), (2)
where E is the loss function, and Nr is the number of the
input and output pairs in the training dataset.
During the learning stage, the network is updated iteratively
by changing its weights until E is minimized or lower than
a threshold. With different weights, the trained ANN model
will have different performances. Many optimization methods
have been devised to achieve this goal. One commonly used
approach is the back-propagation, which uses the stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) method to estimate the gradients of
E with respect to the weights. Each weight w is updated as
follows:
wj+1 = wj − η
Nr
Nr∑
m=1
∇wL(zˆm,j , zm), (3)
where j denotes the jth iteration, zˆm,j is the mth output value
at the jth iteration, and η is the learning rate which controls
the speed of the training. The initial weights are set randomly.
In this study, without loss of generality, the hourly loads on
the past seven days are used as the input to the ANN, and
the output of the network is the average load on the next day.
This forecasting provides important information so that the
wholesale market can better understand the loads in specific
regions or load zones [33]. To improve the effectiveness of
the learning process, the input and output training data and
the input testing data are scaled through the use of natural
logarithm before the learning stage. In this study, the ANN
model has three layers with 50 neurons in the hidden layer. The
relationship between the input and output is mapped, learned,
and stored into the weights via the two-year training dataset.
The performance of the trained ANN is examined with the
one-year testing data, as shown in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 2. An example of scaling, ramping and random attacks with the data
from 1 January 2005 to 7 January 2005.
To evaluate the accuracy of the predicted results, the mean
absolute percentage error (MAPE) is calculated as follows:
MAPE =
100%
Ne
Ne∑
m=1
|ym − yˆm
ym
|, (4)
where Ne is the number of the input and output pairs in the
testing dataset, yˆm and ym are the predicted and observed
values scaled back from logarithmic values, respectively. The
smaller the MAPE, the higher the accuracy of the ANN model.
The MAPE for the forecasting performance in Fig. 1 is 7.6%,
a relatively low value in the load forecasting community for
one-day ahead forecasting.
C. Attack Models
Adversaries may have different skill levels, e.g., compromis-
ing meter readings, gaining the access to a business network,
or hijacking industrial control systems [34], to apply their at-
tack strategies on the forecasting data. Eventually, an adversary
needs to alter the data, causing an inaccurate forecasting result.
A variety of forms can be used to model different attacks,
among which the scaling attack, ramping attack, and random
attack [10], [11], [35] have often been adopted in the literature.
In this paper, the three attack models are also utilized.
Note that, 1) the three attack models are somehow repre-
sentative; many other attack templates, e.g., pulsing attack, or
more sophisticated attacks, can be represented by one of these
attacks via a specific configuration, or by a proper combination
of these models; and 2) the AML-based load forecasting works
not only for these three attack models but also for a wide range
of other attacks; as the focus of this paper is to investigate the
performance of AML-based load forecasting, the three models
are used to serve as an example in the paper.
An example of the three attack models is illustrated in
Fig. 2, where the data points are hourly loads obtained in
one week from 1 January 2005 to 7 January 2005. The details
of the three attack models are given below.
1) Scaling Attack: The adversary modifies the true mea-
surements to higher or lower values during the entire duration
of the attack via a constant scaling factor λse. Each data point
xi is modified as
x∗i = λsexi, i = ns, ns + 1, ..., ne, (5)
where x∗i and xi are the compromised and actual data points
at time i, respectively; and ns and ne are the start and end
times of the attack, respectively. For an ANN model whose
input consists of Nin (i.e., 168 in this study) data points, ns
and ne can be expressed as follows:{
ne = Nin − γse
ns = ne + 1− pseNin,
(6)
where pse is the attack proportion. It is the ratio of the number
of attacked data points and the number of total data points.
γse is the attack location, which refers to the distance between
the end time of the attack ne and the end of the total input
data points.
2) Ramping Attack: The adversary modifies the true mea-
surements gradually via a ramp rate λre during the entire
duration of the attack. Each data point xi is modified as
x∗i =
{
[1 + λre(i− ns)]xi, i = ns, ns + 1, ..., bns+ne2 c
[1 + λre(ne − i)]xi, i = bns+ne2 c+ 1, ..., ne
(7)
where bns+ne2 c is the floored value of ns+ne2 [11]. The
definitions of ns and ne for the ramping attack are the same as
those for the scaling attack (shown in (6)). Here, we use pre
and γre to replace pse and γse, respectively, to better represent
the parameters of ramping attack.
Note that the ramping attack ramps up the data at first
and then ramps down the data, such that the attack is less
noticeable than the scaling attack.
3) Random Attack: The adversary randomly selects a pro-
portion pde of all the data points in the training dataset and
modifies the selected true measurements via a constant scaling
factor λde, as described below:
x∗i = λdexi. (8)
As shown in Fig. 2, the random attack has two parameters,
namely the attack proportion pde and the scaling factor λde.
The definition of pde is the same as those for pse and pre.
D. Impact Analysis
The impacts of the three attacks on the ANN load forecast-
ing are evaluated in this subsection using the configurations
shown in Table I. The configurations are set in a reasonable
way based on the characteristics of the dataset. In this study,
the input to the ANN model consists of 168 hourly data points
in total. For the ramping attack, the maximum pre is set at
(168 − γre)/168 to represent the proportion of the attacked
data from the beginning of the week (represented as 168) to
the attack location γre (see Fig. 2). For the scaling attack, the
maximum pse is set at 0.1428 such that one day of load data
are attacked. It is reasonable to set the maximum pse at 0.1428
while setting the maximum pde at one, because the attacks on
more recent data (namely, the data more closely to the end
of the week in Fig. 2) have a much greater impact on the
forecasting. γse and γde are selected among {0, 24, 48, 72}.
These numbers are selected as an example in this study to
represent different attack locations.
The performances of the ANN load forecasting model under
the three attacks are illustrated in Figs. 3-5, respectively. It can
be seen that, 1) for each attack model, the impact can be severe
under certain configurations, and this is why robust versions
4TABLE I
CONFIGURATIONS OF ATTACK PARAMETERS
Scaling Attack λse pse γse[0.4, 2] [0, 0.1428] {0, 24, 48, 72}
Ramping Attack λre pre γre[0, 1] [0, (168-γre)/168] {0, 24, 48, 72}
Random Attack λde pde[0.4, 2] [0, 1]
of forecasting are needed; and 2) the attacks on more recent
data have much greater impact on the forecasting.
III. AML-BASED LOAD FORECASTING
This section describes the main issues specific to AML-
based load forecasting, including 1) the generation of adver-
sarial examples, 2) adversarial training process, 3) accelerated
adversarial training, and 4) the framework.
A. Adversarial Examples
In a traditional ANN, the model’s input training data are
clean, which renders the forecasting results sensitive to mali-
cious data as illustrated in Figs. 3-5. AML enhances robustness
against attacks via an adversarial training such that the input
training data are augmented with adversarial examples.
Most of the existing works on generating adversarial exam-
ples are focused on image recognition. An adversarial example
xadv is generated such that it should have a small distance to
the true input x, while at the same time resulting in a different
output. Note that xadv and x are vectors that contain multiple
single values. Mathematically, xadv is defined as follows [24]:
fW (x
adv) 6= z ∧ d(x, xadv) ≤ , (9)
where W is the weight matrix of the neural network, fW (·)
represents the output of the network, z is the actual value,  is
a given small value, and d(·, ·) represents the distance between
two vectors, e.g., x and xadv in (9).
Generating an adversarial example is equivalent to finding
an xadv that satisfies (9). It is, however, difficult for attackers
to directly solve (9). One modification is to convert (9) to the
following optimization problem:
argmax
xadv
L(fW (x
adv), z) (10)
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Fig. 3. The performance of ANN load forecasting under the scaling attack.
(a) γse is 0. (b) γse is 24. (c) γse is 48. (d) γse is 72.
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s.t. d(x, xadv) ≤ , (11)
where L(·, ·) is the squared error loss as defined in (1). From
(10) and (11), an adversarial example xadv is generated based
on the idea that once the squared error loss is maximized, it
is more likely that the output of the network will be altered.
B. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training aims to optimize the weight matrix
W , which minimizes the upper bound of (10) for all xadv .
Mathematically, the objective is expressed as
argmin
W
max
(x,z)∈D
max
d(x,xadv)≤
L(fW (x
adv), z), (12)
where D is the dataset, e.g., the training dataset. The idea of
adversarial training is to solve (12) by iteratively executing
the following two steps [24]: 1) with all given xadv , find the
optimal W for the outer minimization problem, and 2) with
the given W , find the worst-case adversarial example xadv in
the dataset D for the left inner maximization problem.
The standard SGD method is used to train the network by
estimating the weight matrix W . Similarly to (3), each weight
w is updated as follows:
wj+1 = wj − η
Nr
Nr∑
m=1
∇wL(fW (xadvm,j), zm), (13)
where xadvm,j is the adversarial example with regards to the m
th
input and output pair at the jth iteration.
C. Accelerated Adversarial Training
In order to produce a different network output, the adversary
uses (10) and (11) to generate an adversarial example for an
existing work such as image recognition. In the context of
5cyberattack-resilient load forecasting, however, the need to use
the optimization to generate the adversarial examples is weak,
because any change on the input vector for load forecasting
directly leads to a different output. Further, according to
(12) and (13), the adversarial examples are re-generated at
every iteration during the training stage, which inevitably
makes the training process complicated and time-consuming.
To make the process more efficient, we present an accelerated
adversarial training in this paper. Two modifications are made
as shown below:
• Instead of re-generating the adversarial examples at each
iteration, the presented training only generates the adver-
sarial examples once (before the first iteration).
• To avoid the complex optimization process in (10) and
(11), the adversarial examples are generated simply based
on the attack models, e.g., (5)-(8). For instance, if the
scaling attack is employed to generate adversarial exam-
ples, each input training data point is modified based on
the attack parameters provided by (5).
This accelerated adversarial training still maintains robust
performance against cyberattacks, as the input to the ANN
model is augmented with the adversarial examples. But, at the
same time, it becomes more efficient and easier to employ.
The runtime of the algorithm to produce one output is only
around 16 milliseconds in this study.
This accelerated adversarial training then estimates the
weights iteratively according to (13) with constant adversarial
examples xadvm replacing the varying x
adv
m,j .
Note that, when generating the adversarial examples, the
attack models are employed on the input training data. How-
ever, if there is an attack, the attack model will be on the
input testing data. To distinguish between the attack models
in the training dataset and those in the testing dataset, the
attack parameters in the training dataset for the three attacks
are represented as λsr, psr, γsr, λrr, prr, γrr, λdr and pdr.
In this paper, the adversarial training methods that use the
scaling, ramping and random attack models are represented as
ScalAdv, RampAdv and RandAdv, respectively.
D. Framework of AML-based Load Forecasting
When employing the adversarial training approach for load
forecasting, it was unclear how to set the attack model and
its configuration for the adversarial training. Basically, there
are two major concerns that are challenging but critical in this
process:
• Due to the unknown behavior of the adversary, both the
attack model and its configuration are unknown to the
defender. Thus, the adversarial training with a specific
attack model and a given configuration may not perform
well in reality under other attack scenarios.
• As the input training data are augmented with adversarial
examples, a side-effect is that the accuracy of the load
forecasting will become worse in normal cases when
there is no attack.
To tackle the above challenges, this paper establishes a
framework for the AML-based load forecasting to properly
set the attack model and its configuration for the adversarial
Algorithm 1: AML-based Load Forecasting
Input: Training and testing data, attack models, Th
Output: Attack model, its configuration
initialize W , η;
for every attack model do
for every configuration do
Generate xadv and train the ML model;
Calculate MAPE using the clean testing data;
if MAPE lower than Th then
Reserve the configuration;
else
Discard the configuration;
end
end
for every reserved configuration do
Generate xadv and train the ML model;
Calculate MAPE using the testing data under the
same attack model with different configurations;
end
Select the configuration with the best performance;
end
Among all the reserved attacks, select the one that has
the overall best performance when the testing data are
attacked by all the attacks.
training. The procedures are formalized in Algorithm 1 and
mainly consist of three stages.
In the first stage, a threshold Th is first determined by
the defender. It restricts the error of load forecasting when
there is no attack. For instance, if Th is 0.1, the MAPE
of AML-based load forecasting should be lower than 0.1
using the clean testing data. Each attack model with each of
its configurations is then employed individually to generate
the adversarial examples and train the ANN model. The
corresponding MAPEs are calculated using the trained ANN
models and clean testing data. If a MAPE is lower than Th,
then the corresponding attack model and configuration are
reserved; otherwise, this configuration is discarded.
In the second stage, every reserved attack model and each
of its reserved configurations are employed to generate the
adversarial examples and train the ANN model. The MAPEs
are then calculated using the trained ANN models and the
contaminated testing data under the same attack models with
different configurations. For instance, if ScalAdv is employed
with a specific configuration, each MAPE is calculated using
the contaminated testing data under the scaling attack with
each of its configurations. Then, for each reserved attack
model, the configuration with the best overall performance
(i.e., the overall lowest MAPE) under the same attack model
with different configurations is selected.
In the last stage, among all the reserved attack models
with the selected configurations, the one with the best overall
performance when the testing data are attacked by all the
attacks is selected.
6IV. RESULTS
In this section, the comparison results are provided, which
include 1) the AML approach’s performance without attack, 2)
an evaluation of different configurations, 3) a comparison of
ScalAdv, RampAdv and RandAdv results under same attacks,
4) a comparison of the ScalAdv, RampAdv and RandAdv
results under different attacks, and 5) the impact of Th. The
data used in this section are described in Section II Part A.
A. AML Performance without Attack
Figs. 6-8 give the performances of ScalAdv, RampAdv
and RandAdv with different parameters when there is no
attack. The configurations of the adversarial training’s attack
parameters are the same as those shown in Table I. The red
points in Figs. 6-8 represent the MAPEs below 0.1.
It can be seen that 1) using different attack models and
different configurations in the adversarial training both have
different impacts when there is no attack, and 2) the impact can
be undesirably large if the attack model and its configuration
are not properly set. It is therefore critical to properly select
the attack model and its configuration for a small impact when
there is no attack. When the threshold Th is set at 0.1, all the
configurations that correspond to the red points in Figs. 6-8
match the requirement and will be reserved.
B. Evaluation of Different Configurations
Among the reserved configurations, one configuration
should be selected for each attack model in the adversarial
training. To find the suitable one, the impact of each parameter
is evaluated in this subsection.
Table II gives the MAPEs of ScalAdv-based load forecast-
ing when γsr is 0 and there is no attack. The MAPEs in the
shaded area are lower than Th, i.e., 0.1. To evaluate the impact
of λsr, the γsr and psr are fixed at 0 and 0.0119, respectively,
and λsr is tuned to 1.2, 1.6 and 2, respectively. The impact
of λsr under the scaling attack is illustrated in Fig. 9 (a)-(c),
where ‘Trad.’ refers to the traditional load forecasting method
that uses the normal ANN model. It can be seen that 1) when
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Fig. 7. The performance of RampAdv-based load forecasting with different
λrr , prr and γrr when there is no attack. (a) γrr is 0. (b) γrr is 6. (c) γrr
is 12. (d) γrr is 18.
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Fig. 8. The performance of RandAdv-based load forecasting with different
λdr and pdr when there is no attack.
λse is large, a larger λsr will have lower MAPEs in most cases
with different pse; and 2) when λse is small, even though a
larger λsr leads to higher MAPEs when pse is small, all those
MAPEs are below Th. Within the shaded area in Table II, a
larger λsr tends to perform better when under attacks.
The impact of psr under the scaling attack is illustrated in
Fig. 9 (d)-(f). γsr and λsr are fixed at 0 and 1.2, respectively,
and psr is tuned to 0.0119, 0.0238 and 0.0357, respectively.
It can be seen that, similarly to λsr, within the shaded area in
Table II, a larger psr performs better when under attacks.
Figs. 9 (g)-(i) illustrate the impact of γsr under the scaling
attack. λsr and psr are fixed at 2 and 0.0119, respectively, and
γsr is tuned to 0, 6, 12 and 18, respectively. It can be seen
that 1) a lower γsr tends to have lower MAPEs in most cases
with different pse; and 2) even though a lower γsr leads to
higher MAPEs when λse and pse are small, all those MAPEs
are below Th. Therefore, with a given λsr and psr, a lower
γsr tends to perform better when under attacks.
Based on the above discussion, it can be observed that the
three configurations marked in red in Table II tend to perform
better under attacks than the others in the shaded area.
The selection of the parameters for RampAdv and RandAdv
is not discussed here because similar observations were ob-
tained for RampAdv and RandAdv. The desired configurations
for RampAdv and RandAdv are set as the red ones in Table
III and Table IV, respectively.
C. AML Performance under Same Attacks
In this subsection, the performances of the selected con-
figurations in the previous subsection are compared under the
7TABLE II
MAPES OF SCALADV-BASED LOAD FORECASTING WITH γsr=0 UNDER
NO ATTACK
λsr
psr 0 0.0119 0.0238 0.0357 0.0476 0.0595
1.2 0.076 0.0817 0.0883 0.0915 0.1038 0.1112
1.4 0.076 0.0869 0.0981 0.1122 0.1341 0.1512
1.6 0.076 0.0911 0.1082 0.1331 0.1572 0.1831
1.8 0.076 0.0956 0.1181 0.1531 0.1827 0.2208
2.0 0.076 0.0978 0.1301 0.168 0.2071 0.2464
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Fig. 9. The performance of ScalAdv-based load forecasting under the scaling
attack with γse=0. (a)-(c) γsr is 0, psr is 0.0119, and λse is 1.2, 1.6 and 2,
respectively. (d)-(f) γsr is 0, λsr is 2, and λse is 1.2, 1.6 and 2, respectively.
(g)-(i) λsr is 2, psr is 0.0119, and λse is 1.2, 1.6 and 2, respectively.
same attack models. For the sake of convenience, the ScalAdv
using the three configurations with MAPEs of 0.0915, 0.0981
and 0.0978 in Table II are represented as ScalAdv1, ScalAdv2
and ScalAdv3, respectively. Similarly, the RampAdv using the
configurations with MAPEs of 0.095 and 0.098 in Table III
are represented as RampAdv1 and RampAdv2, respectively,
and the RandAdv using the configurations with MAPEs of
0.0978 and 0.0972 in Table IV are represented as RandAdv1
and RandAdv2, respectively.
Figs. 10 (a)-(c) compare the results derived from ScalAdv1,
ScalAdv2 and ScalAdv3 under the scaling attack; Figs. 10 (d)-
(f) compare the results derived from RampAdv1 and Ram-
pAdv2 under the ramping attack; and Figs. 10 (g)-(i) compare
the results derived from RandAdv1 and RandAdv2 under the
random attack. For the scaling and ramping attacks, γse and
TABLE III
MAPES OF RAMPADV-BASED LOAD FORECASTING WITH γrr=0 UNDER
NO ATTACK
λrr
prr 0 0.0714 0.1428 0.2142 0.2856 0.3570
0.01 0.076 0.0821 0.095 0.1071 0.1165 0.1136
0.02 0.076 0.0881 0.1171 0.1501 0.159 0.155
0.03 0.076 0.093 0.149 0.1912 0.2122 0.2064
0.04 0.076 0.098 0.1752 0.2371 0.2455 0.2299
0.05 0.076 0.1054 0.1961 0.2682 0.2771 0.268
TABLE IV
MAPES OF RANDADV-BASED LOAD FORECASTING UNDER NO ATTACK
λdr
pdr 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
1.2 0.076 0.084 0.0901 0.0978 0.1074 0.118
1.4 0.076 0.087 0.1031 0.1202 0.1423 0.1665
1.6 0.076 0.0931 0.118 0.15 0.1762 0.2031
1.8 0.076 0.0972 0.1324 0.1705 0.1997 0.238
2.0 0.076 0.1067 0.1452 0.1887 0.2244 0.2667
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Fig. 10. Comparison results of ScalAdv, RampAdv and RandAdv under same
attack models. (a) Under scaling attack, λse is 1.2. (b) Under scaling attack,
λse is 1.6. (c) Under scaling attack, λse is 2. (d) Under ramping attack, λre
is 0.02. (e) Under ramping attack, λre is 0.06. (f) Under ramping attack, λre
is 0.1. (g) Under random attack, λde is 1.2. (h) Under random attack, λde is
1.6. (i) Under random attack, λde is 2.
γre are both fixed at zero. It can be seen that the selected con-
figurations perform similarly under the same attack models. In
this study, ScalAdv3, RampAdv2 and RandAdv2 are selected
for ScalAdv, RampAdv and RandAdv, respectively, and their
performances under different attack models will be compared
in the next subsection.
D. AML Performance under Different Attacks
This subsection investigates the AML approach’s perfor-
mance under other attacks. Figs. 11 (a)-(c) compare the results
of ScalAdv, RampAdv and RandAdv under the scaling attack;
Figs. 11 (d)-(f) compare the results of ScalAdv, RampAdv
and RandAdv under the ramping attack; and Figs. 11 (g)-
(i) compare the results of ScalAdv, RampAdv and RandAdv
under the random attack. Note that the configurations for Scal-
Adv, RampAdv and RandAdv here are the same as those for
the previous section’s ScalAdv3, RampAdv2 and RandAdv2,
respectively.
It can be seen that 1) ScalAdv, RampAdv and RandAdv
all have more robust performances than the traditional ANN
even under other attacks, which validates the effectiveness
and superiority of the AML-based methods in tackling the
attacker’s unknown behaviors; and 2) as long as the MAPE
when there is no attack is fixed, the performances of ScalAdv,
RampAdv and RandAdv are similar with each other, which
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Fig. 11. Comparison results of ScalAdv, RampAdv and RandAdv under
different attack models. (a) Under scaling attack, λse is 1.2. (b) Under scaling
attack, λse is 1.6. (c) Under scaling attack, λse is 2. (d) Under ramping attack,
λre is 0.02. (e) Under ramping attack, λre is 0.06. (f) Under ramping attack,
λre is 0.1. (g) Under random attack, λde is 1.2. (h) Under random attack,
λde is 1.6. (i) Under random attack, λde is 2.
is reasonable, because the total changes on the input training
data for different AML approaches become similar.
Note that if other attack models, e.g., a combination of
different attack models, are employed by the adversary, the
AML-based load forecasting will have similar performance
with those in Fig. 11. That is, the performance of the AML-
based approach with a given threshold would perform better
than the traditional ANN method when the attack is strong,
but slightly worse than the traditional ANN method when the
attack is weak or when there is no attack.
E. Impact of Th
The impact of Th is evaluated in this subsection. Figs. 12
(a)-(c) compare the results of ScalAdv with different Ths under
the scaling attack. The configuration of ScalAdv with each Th,
i.e., 0.0978, 0.1531 or 0.2071, is selected based on the MAPEs
using ScalAdv when there is no attack as shown in Table II.
For instance, when γsr=0, λsr=2 and psr=0.0476, the MAPE
of load forecasting under no attack is 0.2071 (see Table II),
which is one of the Ths here.
Similarly, Figs. 12 (d)-(f) compare the results of RampAdv
with different Ths under the ramping attack, and the config-
uration for each Th, i.e., 0.098, 0.1439 or 0.2229, is selected
based on the MAPEs using RampAdv under no attack. Figs.
12 (g)-(i) compare the results of RandAdv with different Ths
under the random attack, and the configuration for each Th,
i.e., 0.0972, 0.1452 or 0.1887, is selected based on the MAPEs
using RandAdv under no attack.
It can be observed that:
• With a given Th, the AML-based load forecasting per-
forms particularly well when the attack is strong, i.e., the
attack proportion and scaling factor/ramp rate are large.
• For each ScalAdv, RampAdv and RandAdv, a larger
Th tends to have better performance when the attack is
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Fig. 12. Comparison results of ScalAdv, RampAdv and RandAdv with
different Ths under same attack models. (a) Under scaling attack, λse is
1.2. (b) Under scaling attack, λse is 1.6. (c) Under scaling attack, λse is 2.
(d) Under ramping attack, λre is 0.02. (e) Under ramping attack, λre is 0.06.
(f) Under ramping attack, λre is 0.1. (g) Under random attack, λde is 1.2.
(h) Under random attack, λde is 1.6. (i) Under random attack, λde is 2.
strong; but at the same time, the performance is worse
when the attack is small. It is a trade-off between enhanc-
ing the robustness against cyberattacks and maintaining
the forecasting accuracy when there is no attack.
In practice, the clean dataset is often obtained by using
anomaly detection methods, which identify the rare observa-
tions such as outliers and abnormal patterns. In the future, this
AML-based approach can be properly combined with other
approaches, such that it is switched on only when alarms are
raised by the anomaly detection methods.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the feasibility of applying AML
for cyberattack-resilient load forecasting. While most existing
works fail to tackle the attacker’s unknown behaviors, the
presented AML approach addresses this gap by developing
an adversarial training that is able to employ a wide range of
attack models. Future works could be done on applying this
approach to forecasting hourly real-time system demand or
peak load to provide more information for different electricity
markets. This method could also be further improved by
combining it with other approaches.
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